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The so-called “electricity wholesale market” is, in fact, a sequence of several markets. The 
chain is closed with a provision for “balancing,” in which energy from all wholesale markets is 
balanced under the authority of the Transmission Grid Manager (TSO in Europe, ISO in the 
United States). In selecting the market design, engineers in the European Union have 
traditionally preferred the technical role of balancing mechanisms as “security mechanisms.” 
They favour using penalties to restrict the use of balancing energy by market actors.  
While our paper in no way disputes the importance of grid security, nor the competency of 
engineers to elaborate the technical rules, we wish to attract attention to the real economic 
consequences of alternative balancing designs. We propose a numerical simulation in the 
framework of a two-stage equilibrium model. This simulation allows us to compare the 
economic properties of designs currently existing within the European Union and to measure 
their fallout. It reveals that balancing designs, which are typically presented as simple variants on 
technical security, are in actuality alternative institutional frameworks having at least four 
potential economic consequences: a distortion of the forward price; an asymmetric shift in the 
participants’ profits; an increase in the System Operator’s revenues; and inefficiencies. 
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1 Introduction 
The competitive electricity wholesale market is, in fact, a sequence of several markets. The 
sequencing of these markets serves to organise the interactions between a number of modules, by 
either merging or separating them. These notably include: a futures market, a “day ahead” 
forward market, a congestion management mechanism, a reserves market, a balancing market, 
sometimes an explicit market for transmission capacity, and sometimes also a market for 
generation capacity. The precise configuration of this sequence comprises the overall 
institutional arrangement of an electricity reform: its market design. Owing to the highly modular 
nature of this sequence, distinctions between the institutional arrangements of electricity reforms 
take the form of either numerous differences all along the sequence of modules, or of a few 
variations within a single module.  
Our paper shall focus on a single link in this chain, the last one: real-time energy balancing. In 
this module, direct control over all operations of injecting or withdrawing power, from several 
minutes or hours before real time until its actual implementation in real time, is placed under the 
direct and exclusive authority of the transmission grid manager (TSO in Europe, ISO in the 
United States). This module is of the greatest importance, both technically and economically, 
since the impossibility of storing energy means that it has to be generated and consumed in “real 
time.”  
However, this “balancing” module is neither the best known of the electricity reforms, nor the 
one with the greatest volume of activity. Of the competitive reforms in the European Union 
(Glachant and Lévêque (2005)), the market modules that have received the most attention and 
analysis are, first, the exchanges (PXs), in which short-term (day ahead or intraday) and long-
term (usually one month to one year = futures) energy contracts are traded and, also, OTC 
markets which deal with the same timeframes (with or without brokers). Next are the congestion 
management modules, which may be merged with, or separate from, day ahead markets, and 
which sometimes take the form of explicit transmission capacity markets. All together, these 
markets, which are the best known, account for over 95 percent of the volume of electricity 
trading. 
In reality, the effective importance of any element in the sequence of electricity market 
modules is not necessarily determined by its volume of activity or by its visibility outside of the 
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world of electricity professionals. As everyone had the opportunity to learn during the California 
crisis and the blackouts in New York and Rome, secondary mechanisms can be absolutely vital 
under some conditions. It is widely understood by now that the electricity sector presents a 
special combination of unique characteristics, such as: the impossibility of storing significant 
quantities; the range of variation and uncertainty in consumption and generation; the short-term 
price inelasticity of demand; and the constraint of ongoing real-time balancing of consumption 
and generation. 
Given these properties, one would guess that the institutional arrangements ensuring real-time 
energy balancing must be much more than a technical security mechanism for the electrical 
system, rather a centrepiece in the competitive structure. Aside from their physical role in 
balancing global volumes of supply and demand, these arrangements also provide the sequence 
of electricity markets with the only real-time price formation mechanisms. Since this real-time 
energy is the only form of power that is physically tradable between wholesale market operators, 
its price provides the “real” basis for the entire chain of forward prices, from futures through day 
ahead, inclusively (Hirst (2001)).  
In practice, competitive reforms apply two broad variants of balancing arrangements. These are 
easily distinguished, with one being a “real-time market” and the other a “balancing 
mechanism.” The principal difference between these two arrangements is that the “real-time 
market” uses its market equilibrium price to impute a value to electricity in real time, while the 
“balancing mechanism” imposes a penalty that creates a substantial gap between the purchase 
and sales price of power.  
This penalty, specific to balancing mechanisms, is incorporated into the prices of the observed 
gap between the forecasted magnitudes of forward contracts (which are negotiated prior to real 
time, especially day ahead and intraday) and the real magnitudes of consumption and generation 
(measured continually by the Transmission Grid Operator as injections and withdrawals from the 
grid). 
The main argument used in the European Union to rationalise imposing such a penalty is an 
engineering argument. The security of the electricity system, which is the top priority of the 
transmission system operator (TSO), would be imperilled if real-time energy market prices were 
used. Given that the primary electricity wholesale markets actually function as forward markets 
(regardless of the timeframe under consideration, in particular futures and day ahead or intraday 
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markets), the argument advanced is that paying balancing power at its market value would 
provide an incentive to market agents to intentionally create imbalances in their forward market 
trading schedules. In this paper we will not examine this engineering argument regarding 
security—an economic analysis frame thereof can be found in Joskow and Tirole (2004). We 
treat the choices of the engineers of European Union’s TSOs in terms of network security as an 
institutional given (ETSO (2003)). We do not propose an alternative security analysis or choice 
of security measures.  
We limit our labours to an economic evaluation of the institutional arrangements already in 
place for balancing energy in real time. We are essentially comparing two types of existing 
arrangements: the market arrangement using market prices, which will serve as a benchmark, 
and the penalty-based balancing mechanism. This comparison has real empirical relevance 
within the European Union, since France and Belgium implement balancing mechanisms that 
rely on penalties (as does the United Kingdom, Newbery (2005)), while the real-time market 
solution remains possible in the Netherlands. Moreover, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
are three bordering countries on continental Europe that are currently engaged in discussions on 
coordinating their PXs and on provisions for allocating interconnections. The fact that the 
operation of these PXs and interconnections is linked to their balancing arrangements reinforces 
the interest in such an assessment. 
Our paper will not address the technical details of balancing arrangements. Rather, it will 
concentrate on the economic properties of the two existing broad families of configuration 
(balancing mechanism vs. real-time market), treating them as institutional, rather than purely 
technical arrangements. With “institutional arrangement,” we mean a set of rules of the game for 
economic agents that delimit their decision making powers, their information mechanisms, and 
their incentive structures. These economic agents are, on the one hand, the TSO, who sets the 
rules governing balancing, and, on the other hand, wholesale market participants (generators and 
retailers) who react to these balancing rules.  
Our work is based on the frame of a two-stage equilibrium model developed by Bessembinder 
and Lemmon (2000). In this frame a first market stage which is the forward market (either day 
ahead or intraday) is followed by a real-time stage. Each participant in these markets, whether 
buyer or seller, forward or real-time, must confront substantial uncertainties, being forced to 
make decisions on the first market (day ahead, etc.) before having all the relevant information. 
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Indeed, during the second, real-time, phase, a positive or negative randomness in consumption 
kicks in and has repercussions on production under the authority of the TSO. Both the generators 
and retailers in this market are characterised by risk aversion. They seek to maximise their utility 
as of the closing of the first of the two markets, which thus serves as a market for hedging the 
risks inherent in the nature of the second market. Since each of these two markets (forward and 
real-time markets) has equilibrium, we can compute the quantities traded and the equilibrium 
price of electricity on each (forward price and real-time price). 
Within this framework, we define penalties—which transform “real-time markets” into a 
“balancing mechanism”—in terms of a parameter modifying the price of positive and negative 
imbalances in the power measured in real time. The TSO compares the volumes committed on 
the day ahead (or intraday) market during the first stage with actual measurements of effective 
consumption and generation during the second stage.  
We also define the time of the “Gate Closure” as a parameter. This is when the TSO 
definitively cuts off trades on forward markets and opens the second period, during which real-
time balancing occurs under its authority. The exact timing of this division between the two 
markets dictates the set of information available to market participants, and thus impacts on the 
level of uncertainty they must confront when making decisions. The uncertainty increases with 
the length of the delay between the closure of the forward market and the real-time market. It 
decreases as this delay shrinks. Numerical examples allow us to compare the economic 
properties of the two families of institutional balancing arrangements (market vs. mechanism).  
In a further variant on the model, we allow generators to use different technologies. One group 
will dispose of a “flexible” technology, which can always respond to randomness after the 
closing of the forward market. The other group uses an “inflexible” technology—which cannot.  
In our analysis we will distinguish between, and assess, four major potential economic 
consequences of the institutional diversity of balancing arrangements: (1°) a distortion of the 
price on the forward market; (2°) an asymmetric shift in the participants’ welfare (especially 
generators vs. retailers); (3°) an increase in the TSO’s revenues, and; (4°) inefficiencies.  
The extent of the potential consequences of the different design alternatives draws our 
attention to the fact that balancing arrangements are not exclusively technical security 
provisions. Our paper reveals that engineers and regulators must account for economic analysis, 
as long as several different balancing arrangements exist that are acceptable to those responsible 
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for the security of the grid.  
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores the principal characteristics of the real-
time operation of electricity systems and the alternative designs of balancing arrangements. 
Then, the prevalent balancing arrangements in place in Western continental Europe are briefly 
presented. Section 3 introduces the two-stage equilibrium model, and develops numerical 
simulations evaluating the potential economic consequences of the two different kinds of 
balancing arrangements. Finally, Section 4 points out the economic significance of these 
differences in balancing design (namely: shifts in prices, profits, and the technology mix in 
generation), and concludes. 
2 Balancing arrangements 
2.1 Real-Time and balancing arrangements in electricity systems 
Electricity systems are subject to a strong real-time constraint of permanent equilibrium 
between injections (generation) and withdrawals (consumption). Even small deviations from the 
equilibrium (imbalances) affect the frequency at which the system operates, which is expressed 
in Hz, until a modification in generation or consumption allows the normal state to be re-
established. In fact, many aspects of the electricity system were designed to function at a 
reference frequency—50 Hz in Europe. Divergences, even minor, from the reference frequency 
can destabilise or damage components of the transmission system and result in harmful 
consequences, such as blackouts (Wood and Wollenberg (1996)). 
Permanent balancing of the electricity system is made all the more difficult by the fact that 
electricity is very expensive to store (cf. the price of batteries). This absence of affordable 
storage is compounded by many uncertainties, especially in consumption, which is virtually 
always changing with no forewarning or commitment. As a result, electricity systems are 
continually adjusting their generation to maintain equilibrium, and the precise conditions of 
supply-demand equilibrium are only known when most of the uncertainties have disappeared. 
This is why balancing must be operated as near as possible to real time.  
Uncertainties can originate from errors in demand forecasts (in particular owing to 
randomness in the climate or social events), errors in forecasts of output (as intermittence in 
wind power, variability in thermal efficiency, outages, etc.), or incidents affecting the 
transmission grid. Furthermore, intertemporal constraints on generation (cost or speed of starting 
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up, or shutting down, plants; cost or speed of adjusting output) can impede the ability of certain 
plants to contribute to adjustments in generation for purposes of balancing. Flexibility in 
generation depends, in particular, on the technology used. Not all technologies are equally able 
to respond to short-term signals (from several hours to 15 minutes). Consequently, preparation 
for real-time balancing begins before the actual moment of “real-time.” 
The fundamental economic consequence resulting from these characteristics of balancing and 
from flexibility in generation is that, in such a short timeframe (say, from one to three hours), we 
cannot leave management of overall electricity equilibrium in the hands of a decentralised 
market (Wilson (2002)). This is why operation of the real-time system, in a real-time framework, 
is entrusted to a central authority who is responsible for the security of the system and enjoys 
special power: the manager of the transmission grid (generally known as the TSO in Europe). 
This is also why the rules of operation during this specific period are defined ex ante in a 
balancing arrangement. 
Nearly all balancing arrangements are based on a process that is organised into successive 
steps (ETSO (2003); Stoft (2002)). In this process, one aggregates the positions of contracts 
previously concluded on forward markets, and which have come to their day ahead or intraday 
term, into the daily schedules. The daily schedules are transmitted to the TSO by authorised 
representatives of the actors on these markets. These forward physical notifications are used by 
the TSO to compute imbalances by comparison with actual measurements of injections and 
withdrawals read off the transmission grid in real time. These discrepancies are subsequently 
settled financially by those who are responsible for them, according to the provisions of the 
balancing arrangements. 
In practice, the first physical notification of schedules, made a day ahead, is solely indicative. 
It can be modified until a fixed point in time, to wit the moment at which the TSO closes the 
intraday window on forward trading. This is why the closing of the forward market by the TSO 
is referred to as “Gate Closure.” At this precise moment, all schedules communicated to the TSO 
become final. They serve for computing the imbalances to be submitted for financial settlement. 
In this way, the timing of the gate closure demarks the closing of the forward markets and the 
opening of the real-time framework under the exclusive operational authority of the TSO. The 
temporal position of the gate closure is thus a key parameter of the design of the balancing 
arrangement, determining the volume of information available for decisions made on forward 
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markets, and thus the level of uncertainty (Figure 1). 
 
Quantity
Quantity
Pr
ob
.
Pr
ob
.
G
at
e 
clo
su
re
Re
al
 T
im
e
Forward Market Real-time Market or 
Mechanism
Time
Demand
G
at
e 
clo
su
re
Re
al
 T
im
e
Forward Market
Time
Demand
Real-time Market or 
Mechanism
Pr
ob
.
Pr
ob
.
G
at
e 
clo
su
re
Re
al
 T
im
e
G
at
e 
clo
su
re
Re
al
 T
im
e
 
Figure 1 : Temporal position of gate closure. 
 
This choice of temporal position of the gate closure occurs under several constraints. After the 
closing of the forward markets, the TSO needs time to analyse the information gathered 
(injections/withdrawals) and to compare this analysis with its own forecasts and with the general 
state of the grid and the system in order to establish how to best ensure overall security. Other 
constraints come into play for the participants in forward markets. For example, if the intraday 
market (operating immediately prior to gate closure) is illiquid, not all participants will be able to 
find counterparties to offer them additional contracts to modify their daily schedules. 
Consequently, the effective position of gate closure may, in practice, be further ahead of real 
time than the official position set out in the balancing arrangements. 
 
Ever since the beginning of the electricity reforms, two different broad designs in balancing 
arrangements have emerged. Broadly speaking, on one side we find reforms having adopted a 
“real-time market” and relying on a single, real-time, price for power—this is most prevalent in 
the United States. On the other side, the reforms more typical of Europe have opted for 
“balancing mechanisms,” which may, or may not, be combined with bilateral contracts for 
supplying the balancing (Boucher and Smeers (2002)). Within the framework of one or the other 
of these designs, the system operator (TSO in EU; ISO in the United States) performs ongoing 
adjustments to the electricity system using either supplies (offers and bids) made available on the 
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market or the balancing mechanisms, or by resorting to options negotiated in advance.1 The 
supplies retained by the TSO are then paid on either a pay-as-bid or a marginal pricing basis. If 
these supplies are inadequate to balance the system, in terms of either quantity or quality, the 
systems operator may exercise previously acquired options on various categories of reserves.2 
The principal difference between these two contrasting conceptions of balancing arrangements 
lies in how they manage the settlement of imbalances.3 If the goal is to discourage imbalances (= 
negative imbalances, demand for balancing electricity) by imposing a supplementary penalty on 
the purchase price of balancing energy, the arrangement operates as a “balancing mechanism.” 
This penalty may be explicit, such as a multiplicative factor applied to the supply cost of the 
balancing mechanism, or implicit, integrated into the method by which the balancing price is 
computed. In general, balancing mechanisms provide for at least two different prices for 
imbalances. One price is applied to positive imbalances, in which energy supplied in excess of 
the schedule is remunerated at below the marginal cost of systems balancing. Another price 
exists for negative imbalances, in which energy supplies below the schedule are priced higher 
than the marginal cost of systems balancing. Some balancing mechanisms use more than two 
prices for imbalances. In particular, the sign of the overall imbalance in the system may be 
compared to the sign of each individual imbalance. This gives rise to two cases. The sign of the 
individual imbalance is the same as the sign for the entire system, in which case it will be 
penalised more severely since it contributes to the global imbalance. Or, the individual sign may 
be the opposite of the overall sign. Finally, the magnitude (absolute or relative) of the individual 
imbalance may be used to distinguish between several bands of imbalances prices. 
The main argument advanced in Europe in defence of imposing penalties on imbalances is that 
market pricing could undermine the security of the electricity system. This is because 
participants in forward markets would have an incentive to increase the risk exposure of the 
electricity system by raising the amount of balancing power transacted during real time. In 
practice, penalizing real-time imbalances also has the effect of transferring some of the risk and 
the responsibility for balancing from the TSO to market participants. Since the penalty on 
                                                 
1 Balancing supplies are also frequently used to manage grid congestion. However, we do not consider congestion management in this article. 
2 Reserve markets or mechanisms, bilateral contracts, or obligatory orders may be used to constitute reserves of power. We assume that all of 
these arrangements function reasonably well, and that they do not interfere with the good functioning of energy markets. Consequently, we do not 
account for the arrangement put in place to constitute reserves. 
3 Other design parameters are ignored here. These are: the basis on which imbalances are calculated (separation into distinct accounts for 
generation and consumption, or a single aggregate account, the unit of time on which imbalances are measured (10 min., 30 min., 1 hour), the 
transparency of the calculation of the price of imbalances, etc. 
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balancing is anticipated ex ante, additional balancing will be implemented by the operators on 
the forward market before gate closure, and this will be observed by the TSO after gate closure.  
We will not critique the logic underlying this reasoning since, in practice, it is the engineers of 
the TSOs who select the rules governing security and balancing. We accept these rules as given. 
We will limit our analysis to examining the economic consequences of the rules chosen by the 
TSOs. Since these rules are not identical across all TSOs, it is possible to compare them, bearing 
in mind that they are all meant to provide an acceptable level of security for at least one TSO. 
However, for an economist, the use of penalties on a market, whether or not they are necessary 
to ensure the security of the system, will inevitably have economic consequences. Here, in 
particular, penalties modify the price of energy in real time, since it is this real-time price that 
constitutes the very basis of the entire chain of forward prices and energy is not storable (Hirst 
(2001) ; Boucher and Smeers (2002)). In fact, it is this real-time arrangement that provides the 
only place on which physical energy can be traded between market participants. All other 
markets, which shut down prior to gate closure, function as forward markets on which prices and 
volumes are negotiated, but no energy actually changes hands. Consequently, it is of some 
interest a priori to examine what economic consequences may arise during real time from the 
imposition of a penalty on the price of real energy trades. 
 
2.2 Balancing Arrangements in Western Europe 
Since there is currently a movement toward the creation of harmonised regional markets in the 
European Union, and France, Belgium, and the Netherlands are in the midst of discussions 
toward this end, it is of particular interest to examine their example in depth (Glachant and 
Leveque (2005)). A cursory look at the market design in these three bordering countries of 
Western Europe reveals that France and Belgium use balancing mechanisms (with penalties or 
an administrative fee), while an arrangement that resembles real-time markets prevails in the 
Netherlands (ETS0 (2003)).4 
In Belgium, the balancing arrangement truly is of a “mechanism,” and not a “market,” type. 
Gate closure occurs a day ahead. There are 16 different types of imbalance prices. These prices 
                                                 
4  Balancing arrangements in England & Wales (under NETA or BETTA) use a dual-cash imbalance pricing. It is therefore considered as a 
“mechanism” and penalties on imbalances arise from the complex manner imbalance prices are computed. See Henney (2002) for more detailed 
analysis of the E&W balancing arrangement. 
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depend on the sign of the individual imbalance (positive or negative), the sign of the global 
imbalance (positive or negative), and the magnitude of the individual imbalance (above or below 
a threshold). Prices on these imbalances are computed with respect to the day ahead price on two 
markets outside of Belgium (APX in the Netherlands and PowerNext in France). Different levels 
of penalties are applied to these day ahead prices on the exchanges. To illustrate, for imbalances 
in excess of the threshold, the price of negative imbalances is fixed at between 110 and 175 
per cent, and that of positive imbalances between 25 and 90 per cent, of the day ahead reference 
price.5 
The balancing arrangement in France also corresponds to a mechanism and not a market. 
There is no rolling gate closure, and notifications from the generators are only accepted during 
specific periods when the windows are open. The mechanism functions with four prices on 
imbalances, which depend upon the relationship between the global sign of the system 
imbalances and that of the individual imbalance. Imbalances with the same sign as that of the 
system are settled with a penalty defined by a constant (k) applied to the mean purchase price of 
energy to the TSO each half-hour. In 2005, this constant k was fixed at 15 per cent.6  
In the Netherlands, the initial design of the balancing arrangement could match the definitions 
of either mechanism or real-time market, depending on the value of the parameter on the 
penalties. The price of the imbalance consists of an energy component, which is the marginal 
cost of balancing energy, and a penalty, called the “incentive component.” The amount of the 
penalty is fixed weekly, and it depends on the state of the system during the preceding weeks. 
This value fell from a mean of approximately 2 euros per MWh in 2001 to around 0.5 euros in 
2002, then was fixed at zero in 2003. Consequently, this same arrangement now functions more 
like a real-time market: There are no more explicit penalties. Even though there are sometimes 
two prices for imbalances with different signs…it is of interest to note that the initial 
“mechanism” was able to metamorphose into a real-time market. Gate closure was set at one 
hour before real time.7 
 
                                                 
5 Information from the Belgian TSO Elia. Website: www.elia.be. This description corresponds to balancing arrangements used in Belgium 
until the end of 2005. In 2006 Belgian balancing mechanism was reformed and its new settings are quite similar to the French balancing 
mechanism.   
6 Information from the French TSO RTE. Website: www.rte-france.com. 
7 Information from the Dutch TSO Tennet. Website: www.tennet.nl. 
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3 Model and numerical simulations 
3.1 The model 
Interactions between forward and real-time markets in a context of uncertainty have been 
examined by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2000), Siddiqui (2002), and Green & McDaniel 
(1999).  
Bessembinder and Lemmon use a two-stage approach to examine equilibrium in a perfectly 
competitive market with risk averse agents. Retailers purchase energy from the forward and real 
time markets and sell it to customers at a fixed unit price. The demand retailers face is stochastic 
and price inelastic. Generators participate into forward and real-time markets as well and take 
their production decisions in real time. Forward contract demand comes from the risk aversion of 
agents. Risk aversion is formalized by setting market agents’ objective to maximize expected 
utility function (a linear mean-variance utility function form : ][2][ ωω ππ VarAE − ). In this frame 
equilibrium forward price depends on the statistical characteristics of real-time price (expected 
value, variance and skewness). These analytical results are then used by Bessembinder and 
Lemmon to “explain” actual forward premium (forward price minus expected real time price) on 
two North American power markets (PJM and California). Siddiqui completes the Bessembinder 
and Lemmon model by introducing a forward market for reserves. Then a two-stage equilibrium 
approach is used to study three perfectly competitive markets: energy forward market, reserve 
forward market and real-time market. Generators and retailers are supposed risk averse as well. 
Demand is stochastic and cases of elastic and inelastic demand are developed. Siddiqui derives 
analytical results relying equilibrium energy and reserves forward prices with statistical 
characteristics of real-time price. The model is applied on the California Market to explain 
forward premium prices. In Green and McDaniel, the interaction between a forward market and a 
balancing mechanism is studied in a framework of perfect competition. Two types of pricing for 
the balancing mechanism (pay-as-bid and marginal price) are addressed in the case of risk 
neutral agents. None of these models account for the existence of penalties in real time, and a 
single (flexible) generation technology is retained. 
In this section we present a two-period equilibrium model to examine the consequences of 
introducing a penalty during real time. We base our work on the Bessembinder & Lemmon 
model and add some modifications. First, we introduce a real-time penalty to build our baseline 
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model. Second, we introduce a new technology, inflexible generators, into our extended model. 
We simplify the empirical diversity of existing balancing arrangements by only distinguishing 
between two types of arrangements. A “pure real-time market” arrangement, thus without 
penalties, and a “balancing mechanism,” with penalties. Consequently, the level of penalties 
applied to imbalances observed in real time is the parameter that transforms a real-time market 
into a balancing mechanism. The temporal position of gate closure is, in turn, represented by a 
parameter capturing the magnitude of the potential deviation from final demand (= the value of 
the standard deviation of demand) at real time. 
We also retain the assumption of perfectly competitive forward and real-time markets. We 
analyse production decisions as being independent over time, between two successive sequences 
of equilibria on two markets, on the basis that the impossibility of storing electricity makes the 
two markets independent of each other. To simplify, we also assume that all uncertainty is 
resolved in real time. Therefore, the only decisions made under uncertainty are on the forward 
market, and this uncertainty is solely attributable to the stochastic nature of demand.  
Making decisions on the forward market is thus risky. The fact that agents are risk averse 
creates a demand for forward contracts to hedge against risks assumed up until real time (in a 
context of absence of risk aversion and perfect competition, agents would have no reason to buy 
on the forward market…). To model this behaviour, we assume that each agent maximises utility 
over a profit function of the form ][
2
][)]([ ωωωω πππ VarAEUE −≡ , where ω  is a stochastic variable 
describing the state of the world. The value of this variable is unknown to agents when they 
make their decisions on forward markets, but will be revealed in real time.  
In this simple model, we only have two retailers, retailer A and retailer B, each of whom faces 
demands that are stochastic and inelastic in real time. We assume that these demands are 
independent: They are uncorrelated. Thus, each retailer j  (=A or =B) confronts demands that 
may assume one of two states: a low level of demand ( lowjD ,  ) and a high level of demand ( highjD ,  
), with probabilities p  and )1( p−   respectively.8 Thus, the expected values of the two retailers’ 
demands are: AD  and BD . Total demand is the sum of the two individual demands of the 
retailers.  
There will thus be at most four possible states of the world of System Demand (Figure 2). 
                                                 
8 For the sake of simplicity, the same probability distribution, characterized by probabilities p and (1-p), is used for both retailers. 
 14
States of 
the world 
(ω ) System Demand  Demand A Demand B 
1 lowBlowA DDD ,,1 +=    lowBD ,  
   lowAD ,   
2 highBlowA DDD ,,2 +=    highBD ,  
     
3 highAlowB DDD ,,3 +=    lowBD ,  
   highAD ,   
4 
 
highBhighA DDD ,,4 +=  
 
 
 highBD ,  
 
Figure 2 : States of the world of System Demand 
 
On Figure 3 we see the distribution function of System Demand.9 
 
Figure 3 : System demand distribution function. 
 
We also assume that all agents know the distribution function of the stochastic variable, ω  , 
and that the flexible generators have sufficient capacity to satisfy all possible demand (there are 
no structural problems with generation capacity or providing for reserves). This simplified model 
allows us to more easily study the consequences of introducing penalties in real time. 
This section continues with a description of the agents and the TSO in Part 3.3.1 and a list of 
variables and parameters in Part 3.3.2. Finally, Part 3.3.3 describes the baseline model, in which 
generation technology is flexible for all producers. In the appendix we provide an overview of 
the extended model with two types of generation technology: flexible and inflexible. 
 
                                                 
9 Note that the probability distribution function is asymmetric (p>0.5). In our numerical examples, an asymmetric distribution is used to 
account for the convexity of the supply curve, which is ignored in our linear marginal cost model.  
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3.1.1 Market Participants and the TSO 
In our two models, the baseline and extended model, we find four types of economic agents: 
two types of generators (flexible and inflexible), retailers, and the TSO. 
 
FLEXIBLE GENERATORS 
There are FGN   identical flexible producers. The can sell their electricity on the forward 
market or in real time. Their cost function is quadratic: 2)( 2
iii FGFGFGFG
XXCT σ= . These 
generators can make and change output decisions up to real time. 
 
INFLEXIBLE GENERATORS 
There are IGN  identical inflexible producers. Owing to the nature of their generation 
technology, they must make their output decisions before gate closure. Afterwards, they cannot 
modify these decisions. Consequently, they only sell on the forward market. Their cost function 
is quadratic: 2)( 2
lll IGIGIGIG
XXCT θ= . 
 
RETAILERS 
Retailers have no control over the real level of their clients’ consumption, which is stochastic 
and inelastic in real time. Retailers buy electricity on the forward and real-time markets, and then 
resell it to their clients at a price fixed in advance in a multi-period contract: CP . The exact 
volume of electricity demand for which each retailer will be responsible in real time, ω,jD  , 
remains unknown at the time of decision making on the forward market.  
Since retailers’ forward purchases never exactly correspond to their clients’ actual 
consumption, they will be in surplus or deficit positions at real time. They buy the corresponding 
quantities from, or sell them to, the TSO, who manages the balancing. In the case of positive 
imbalances, the TSO will pay retailers the real-time price (for a real-time market) or this price 
reduced by k
1   (for a balancing mechanism). In the case of negative imbalances, retailers pay 
the price of the imbalance to the TSO, either at the market price (on a real-time market), or at 
this price multiplied times k   (on a balancing mechanism). When k  = 1, the price of the 
imbalance equals the real-time price, and the balancing arrangement is of the “real-time market” 
 16
type. When k  > 1, the arrangement is of the “balancing mechanism” type.  
 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATOR (TSO) 
The TSO is responsible for balancing the electricity system and, consequently, managing the 
equilibrium between supply and demand in real time.  
 
3.1.2  Variables and parameters 
Parameters: 
• )(ωprob  probability of state of the world ω , 
• ωD  global electricity demand in state of the world ω , 
• FGσ  slope of the marginal cost curve for flexible generators, 
• FGN  number of flexible generators, 
• IGθ  slope of the marginal cost curve for inflexible generators, 
• IGN  number of inflexible generators, 
• k  penalty coefficient, 
• FGA  risk aversion coefficient for flexible generators, 
• RA  risk aversion coefficient for retailers, 
• CP  fixed price at which consumers buy from retailers. 
 
Quantity variables: 
• FFGiX  quantity sold on the forward market by flexible generator i  , 
• FIGlX  quantity sold on the forward market by inflexible generator l , 
• FR jX  quantity purchased by retailer j on the forward market, 
• RTR jX ω,  quantity bought or sold by retailer j in real time (imbalance), 
• RTFGiX ω,  quantity bought or sold by the flexible generator i in real time, 
• 
iFG
X  quantity produced by flexible generator i  , 
• 
lIG
X  quantity produced by inflexible generator l . 
 
Price variables: 
• FP  forward price, 
• RTPω  real-time price for state of the world ω , 
• RTjIP ω,  price of retailer j’s real-time imbalances for state of the world ω . 
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3.1.3  Baseline Model 
Here we solve the optimisation problem of the two types of market participants (generators 
and retailers) by drawing on the market equilibrium presented in Bessembinder and Lemmon. 
Since we have two markets (forward and real-time), there are two stages to the agents’ 
optimisation problem. In principle, these agents first take a position on the forward market on the 
basis of forecasted real-time conditions. Subsequently, in real time, when the state of demand is 
revealed, these agents conduct their real-time transactions in the absence of all uncertainty. 
Our approach to modelling begins with agents’ real-time decision making, given that they 
consider their positions on the forward market, and forward prices, to be given. Once we have 
determined the optimal positions and the prices in real time for each state of the world, we will 
be able to work backwards in time to establish optimal positions and equilibrium prices on 
forward markets. 
3.1.3.1 Real-time transactions 
In real time, the state of the world ω   occurs. Thus, there is no more uncertainty. Furthermore, 
positions on the forward market have already been assumed and the forward price already 
determined. Therefore, they can be treated as fixed. Consequently, we can compute real-time 
positions and the real-time price, knowing that each agent seeks to maximise profit ωπ . 
 
FLEXIBLE GENERATORS 
Flexible generator i’s profit can be written:10 
2
,
**
,, 2
)(
iiiii FG
FGRT
FG
RTF
FG
FRT
FGFG XXPXPX
σπ ωωωω −+=  
Given that the output of the flexible generator must equal the quantity sold on the forward 
market plus (minus) the quantities sold (bought) in real time, RTFGFFGFG iii XXX ωω ,, += , the necessary 
first-order conditions are:   
iXXP
X
X F
FG
RT
FGFG
RT
RT
FG
RT
FGFG
ii
i
ii ∀∀+−==∂
∂
;)(0
)(
,
,
,, ωσπ ωω
ω
ωω  
                                                 
10 Variables designated with * are considered fixed. 
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and so: iXPX FFG
FG
RT
RT
FG ii
∀∀−= ;, ωσ
ω
ω …………….…………………………………………( 1 ) 
 
RETAILERS 
In real time, retailers buy (or sell) the difference between effective demand that actually 
materialises, ω,jD  , and their previous purchases on the forward market 
F
R j
X . Consequently, the 
quantities bought (or sold) in real time are: 
jDXX j
F
R
RT
R jj
∀∀−= ;,, ωωω …………………………………………………..………( 2 ) 
 
The price of imbalances depends on the sign and is defined by : 
j
X
k
P
XkP
IP
RT
R
RT
RT
R
RT
RT
j
j
j ∀∀



>
≤
= ;
)imbalance positive(0if 1
)imbalance negative(0if
,
,
, ω
ωω
ωω
ω ……………...…..…….( 3 ) 
where k is the penalty coefficient ( )1≥k . Notice that, if 1=k , then the price of imbalances 
equals the price of energy. Figure 4 gives an example of computing the imbalance price. 
 
kPIP RTRT 22 =
RTP2
RTP1
Pr
ic
e
Quantity1D 2D
Real-time and Imbalance Prices
k
PIP
RT
RT 1
1 =
Penalty
F
RX
Negative 
Imbalance
Positive 
Imbalancek≤1
Real-time 
supply curve
Pr
ic
e
 
Figure 4 : Example of energy and imbalance prices in real time11 
 
                                                 
11 This example corresponds to the case of a single retailer on the market (demand can only assume two states). 
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TSO 
The TSO is responsible for managing the equilibrium and ensuring that the balancing 
constraint is satisfied for this state of the world. Real-time market clearing conditions are defined 
by : 12  
ωωω ∀−= ∑∑
j
RT
R
i
RT
FG ji
XX ,, ……………………………………………...…………….( 4 ) 
3.1.3.2 Forward Market 
Returning now to the time at which positions were taken on the forward market, we can find 
the equilibrium conditions on this market and the optimal quantities sold by each agent 
participating in it. 
Equilibrium conditions on the forward market are expressed by the following equation: 
∑∑ =
i
F
FG
j
F
R ij
XX ……………………………………………………………..………..( 5 ) 
From equations (2), (3), (4) and (5), we find that: 
FG
FGRT
N
DP σω ωω =∀ ……………….………………………………………..………..( 6 ) 
where ∑=
j
jDD ωω ,   is global demand for the state of the world ω  . 
 
FLEXIBLE GENERATORS 
On the forward market, we can express the profit of flexible generators as: 
( )2,,, 2)( RTFGFFGFGRTFGRTFFGFFFGFG iiiiii XXXPXPX ωωωω σπ +−+=  
The optimization program of flexible generators now consists of choosing FFGiX   so as to 
maximised expected utility, ][
2
][)]([ ,,, ωωωω πππ iii FGFGFGFG Var
A
EUE −≡ , for a given forward price 
FP  , where ω
ω
ω πωπ ,, )(][ iFGFG probE ∑=  and ( )2,,, ][)(][ ωωωω ππωπ iii FGFGFG EprobVar −=∑ . 
Therefore, the first-order necessary conditions are: 
[ ]
i
X
XVarAXE
X
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F
FG
F
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F
FGFG
i
iiii
i
ii ∀=∂


 −∂
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0
)]([
2
)]([)(( ,,, ωωω
πππ
 
                                                 
12 The negative sign on this equation is attributable to the correspondence between the signs on the imbalances and the language used in 
balancing mechanisms to define positive and negative imbalances from the perspective of the TSO.  
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From this equation, along with (1) and (6), we can derive: 
][
],[
][
][ ,
RT
RT
FG
RT
FG
RTF
F
FG PVar
PCov
PVarA
PEPX i
i
ω
ωω
ω
ω ρ+−= ……………………...……………..………..( 7 ) 
 
where ][ RTPE ω   and ][ RTPVar ω  are the expected value and the variance of the real-time price, 
respectively, and ωρ ,iFG  is generator i’s unhedged profit (i.e. with 0=FFGiX  , we have 
2
2,, 2
1)0( ωωω
σπρ D
N
X
FG
FGF
FGFGFG iii
==≡  ).  ],[ , RTFG PCov i ωωρ  is the covariance between the unhedged 
profit and the real-time price. 
 
RETAILERS 
Similarly, we can express retailer j’s profit: RTRRTjFRFjCFRR jjjj XIPXPDPX ωωωωπ ,,,, )( +−= . Retailer 
j  seeks to select FRjX  so as to maximise: ][2
][)]([ ,,, ωωωω πππ jjj RRRR VarAEUE −≡  
The first-order necessary conditions are: 
( )
j
X
XUE
F
R
F
RR
j
jj ∀=∂
∂
0
])([ ,ωπ
 
Using these equations and (4), we can write: 
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where ][ ,RTjIPE ω  and ][ ,RTjIPVar ω   are the expected price of imbalances and the variance of this 
price, respectively. ωρ ,jR  is the unhedged profit of retailer j, (i.e. 
ωωωωω πρ ,,,,, )0( jRTjjCFRRR DIPDPX jjj −==≡  ). ],[ ,, ωωρ jR IPCov j  is the covariance between retailer j’s 
unhedged profit and the price of imbalances. 
For the special case of no penalties ( 1=k  ), we have: 
[ ] j
PVar
PCov
PVarA
PPEX RT
RT
R
RT
R
FRT
F
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j
j
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][
],[
][
,
ω
ωω
ω
ω ρ …...………..……………………………..( 9 ) 
 
 
 21
3.1.3.3 Equilibrium price 
We can now use equations (3), (5) and (6), in conjunction with the optimal forward positions 
(equations (7) and (8)), to determine the equilibrium forward price FP  .  
For example, solving the penalty-free case (k = 1) yields: 
( ) 


 +−×
+
+= 2
3
][][][][2
2
1
2
][ RTRTRTCRT
RFG
FGFG
FGRTF PVarPSkewPVarPPE
AA
N
NPEP ωωωωω σ  
Where ][ RTPE ω  , ][ RTPVar ω  , and ][ RTPSkew ω   are the expected value, the variance, and the 
skewness of the real-time price, respectively.  
This result is equivalent to that of Bessembinder & Lemmon. When there is no penalty in real 
time (the “real-time market” case), the forward price of electricity depends on expectations on 
the real-time price, the statistical properties of total demand, and the parameters of generation 
costs (variance and skewness of real-time prices). 
To solve the cases with a penalty (k > 1) we must make an assumption regarding the sign of 
the imbalances. Let highjFRlowj DXD j ,, ≤≤ , then the prices of the imbalances can be defined for 
every state of the world. This assumption must be confirmed in the numerical simulations. 
Given the complexity of the equation, we will not provide an analytical solution. In the next 
section, we present numerical simulations effected with Mathematica®. 
 
3.2 Numerical simulations & Discussion 
In this section, we use numerical simulations to examine the economic consequences of using 
penalties in real time.  
We shall look at three different cases: 
• A benchmark case—this is the case of a real-time market (no penalty, k = 1), 
• A case we call mechanism No.1, this is a balancing mechanism with a medium penalty of 
(k = 1.2). 
• A case we call mechanism No. 2, this is a balancing mechanism with a high penalty of 
(k = 1.4). 
Each of these three cases is examined for two types of gate closure (closing of the forward 
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market far from, or near to, real time). We represent the various temporal positions of the gate 
closure in terms of their impact on the magnitude of the uncertainty affecting the decision 
making. This is captured by modifying the magnitude of the standard deviation of the demand to 
( 1SysStd =10) or ( 2SysStd =20).  
All these cases are computed in the framework of our baseline model, within which all 
generators are flexible: They can change their output decisions up to real time. 
In our extended model, we also have inflexible generators (alongside flexible generators) who 
must make output decisions before the closing of the forward market. In this case we only 
compute results for an intermediary position of gate closure ( 1SysStd =15).
13 
 
3.2.1  Parameters 
The parameters have to be determined. We simplify this task by borrowing parameters from 
the Bessembinder & Lemmon simulations. In a future version of this model we will conduct 
sensitivity analysis. However, we are already quite certain that the signs of the estimates will not 
be affected, even if their absolute values change. All of these parameters are represented in Table 
I. 
Table I : Parameters 
Description Symbol Value 
Number of flexible generators FGN  10 
Probability of low demand realization p  0.8 
Risk aversion coefficient for flexible generators FGA  0.1 
Risk aversion coefficient for retailers RA  0.02 
Fixed Price to consumers CP  35 
Coefficient of cost for flexible generators FGσ  3 
Expected demand for retailer type A “Less Exposed” AD  200/3 
Expected demand for retailer type B “More Exposed” BD  100/3 
Demand standard deviation for retailer type A AStd  2
SysStd  
Demand standard deviation for retailer type B BStd  2
SysStd  
 
                                                 
13 Only an intermediary position of gate closure is used in the extended model because the “inflexibility” of generators is defined considering 
gate closure position. Therefore, it makes no sense comparing the extended model results for two different gate closure positions.   
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An asymmetric distribution was selected for demand (a positive coefficient of skewness: 
(p>0.5) to account for the substantial convexity of the generators’ supply curve, which is not 
explicitly incorporated in our model—marginal costs are linear despite quadratic cost functions). 
To account for the various temporal positions of the gate closure, the different potential states 
of individual demand are expressed as functions of the expected value and a standard deviation. 
We have: pStdppDD jjlowj )1(, −−=  and )1()1(, pStdppDD jjhighj −−+= . We can show that 
][ ,ωjj DED =   and ][ ,ωjj DVarStd =  . The expected value of global demand is BASys DDD +=  , 
and its standard deviation, BASys StdStdStd +=  . 
The characteristics of demand parameters were chosen to represent various types of agents 
participating in the markets. In particular, type “A” retailers represent large net buyers (who thus 
benefit from bulk discounts on their large orders) or retailers who are vertically integrated with 
generators. Other retailers, called type “B”, represent small-scale net purchasers and those that 
are not vertically integrated: AD  > BD   and 2SysBA StdStdStd == . This explains why the 
ratio of the standard deviation of demand to the expected value of demand is greater for type B 
retailers than for type A retailers AABB DStdDStd > .  
Generators can only be vertically integrated or large-scale net sellers. Consequently, they can 
easily handle an outage in a single one of their plants, and they do not have to deal with any in-
house risk resulting from their own output decisions.  
In our extended model (with both flexible and inflexible generators), we set the number of 
inflexible generators at IGN =10. The coefficient on the flexible generators’ costs changes from 
FGσ =3 to FGσ =6, and the cost coefficient for inflexible generators is fixed at IGσ =6. Thus, the 
global supply curve always corresponds to the supply curve in the first example.  
 
3.2.2 Preliminary Results 
Preliminary results from our baseline model (in which all producers are flexible) are presented 
in Tables II and III.  
The results from our extended model (with both flexible and inflexible generators) are 
presented in Table IV. 
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Table II :  
Baseline model results (only flexible generators)  
with near gate closure (standard deviation of system demand of 10) 
Benchmark Case 1 Case 2 
Near real-time gate closure (Stdsys=10) No penalty 
(k=1) 
Med. 
penalty 
(k=1.2) 
High 
penalty 
(k=1.4) 
Prices Forward price 29,49 29,64 30,11 
Retailer type A 66,48 67,32 69,90 
Retailer type B 33,14 33,98 36,57 Forward Quantity 
Flexible Generators 99,62 101,30 106,47 
Retailer type A 352,33 307,94 236,29 
Retailer type B 168,61 129,27 73,14 Expected Profit 
Flexible Generators 1464,06 1478,52 1526,22 
Retailer type A 348,52 303,00 230,25 
Retailer type B 164,81 124,33 67,09 Expected Utility 
Flexible Generators 1461,48 1476,68 1525,03 
TSO's expected revenue 0,00 69,27 149,35 
Total Expect Utility 1974,8 1973,3 1971,7 
Efficiency 100,00% 99,92% 99,84% 
Production Cost 1515,0 1515,0 1515,0 
Cost and 
efficiency 
Productive efficiency 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
 
 
Table III :  
Baseline Model Results (only flexible generators)  
with far gate closure (standard deviation of system demand of 20) 
Benchmark Case 1 Case 2 
Far real-time gate closure (Stdsys=20) No penalty 
(k=1) 
Med. 
penalty 
(k=1.2) 
High 
penalty 
(k=1.4) 
Prices Forward price 28,91 31,57 33,83 
Retailer type A 70,45 74,15 77,29 
Retailer type B 37,12 40,82 43,96 Forward Quantity
Flexible Generators 107,58 114,97 121,24 
Retailer type A 350,19 70,77 -189,77 
Retailer type B 147,16 -43,55 -228,79 Expected Profit 
Flexible Generators 1442,65 1740,53 2024,31 
Retailer type A 311,50 21,14 -241,86 
Retailer type B 108,47 -93,18 -280,88 Expected Utility 
Flexible Generators 1423,00 1719,11 1985,94 
TSO's expected revenue 0,00 172,25 334,25 
Total Expect Utility 1843,0 1819,3 1797,4 
Efficiency 100,00% 98,72% 97,53% 
Production Cost 1560,0 1560,0 1560,0 
Cost and 
efficiency
Productive efficiency 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
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Table IV :  
Extended model results (flexible & inflexible generators)  
with middle gate closure (standard deviation of system demand of 15) 
Benchmark Case 1 Case 2 
Middle real-time gate closure (Stdsys=15) No penalty 
(k=1) 
Med. 
penalty 
(k=1.2) 
High 
penalty 
(k=1.4) 
Prices Forward price 29,9 31,5 32,8 
Retailer type A 70,6 72,5 74,1 
Retailer type B 37,2 39,2 40,7 
Flexible Generators 57,9 59,2 60,2 
Forward 
Quantity 
Inflexible Generators 49,9 52,5 54,6 
Retailer type A 270,1 85,2 -74,9 
Retailer type B 101,5 -31,4 -148,8 
Flexible Generators 813,7 922,0 1019,8 
Expected 
Profit 
Inflexible Generators 747,1 827,0 895,6 
Retailer type A 212,6 22,4 -138,0 
Retailer type B 44,0 -94,2 -211,9 
Flexible Generators 790,9 893,6 977,9 
Expected 
Utility 
Inflexible Generators 747,1 827,0 895,6 
TSO's expected revenue 0,0 125,9 227,9 
Total Expect Utility 1794,7 1774,7 1751,5 
Efficiency 100,00% 98,88% 97,59% 
Production Cost 1567,5 1571,3 1580,4 
Cost and 
efficiency 
Productive efficiency 100,00% 99,76% 99,18% 
 
3.2.3 Discussion of the results 
Four economic consequences appear in these numerical simulations: (1°) a distortion of the 
forward price; (2°) an asymmetric shift in the welfare of market participants; (3°) an increase in 
the TSO's revenues; and (4°) inefficiencies.  
3.2.3.1 Distortion of forward prices and over-contracting 
The use of penalties in real time changes the opportunity cost to participants on the forward 
market. This results in distortions in the forward price. Figures 5 and 6 present modifications of 
forward prices for the various cases under study.  
Penalties increase the volatility of both the price of imbalances and the covariance between 
retailers’ unhedged profits and these prices. This is why retailers prefer to buy more on forward 
markets to hedge their profits. This creates tension on the forward market and results in a 
distortion of the price on this market. 
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Figure 5 : Influence of penalty on Forward Price in our baseline model (only flexible generation technology) 
 
The distortion of the forward price may modify how the cost of hedging risks is allocated 
between market participants and create a barrier to entry for some agents (cf. the next section). 
Furthermore, these distortions may create the appearance of market power being exercised, 
owing to the reappearance of a “price/cost” mark-up, even when the market is competitive 
(Smeers (2005)). 
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Figure 6 : Influence of penalty on Forward Price in our extended model (with two generation technologies) 
 
Another result of the penalties is over-contracting. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate this with the rate 
of forward purchases by retailers and expected individual demand. We can see that retailers 
almost always seek to buy more than the expected demand, and that this effect is exacerbated 
when a penalty is imposed. Of course, over-contracting is greater when the retailer is more 
exposed (= type B retailer). 
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Figure 7 : Influence of penalty on forward purchase for retailer type A (less exposed retailer). 
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Figure 8 : Influence of penalty on forward purchase for retailer type B (more exposed retailer) 
 
3.2.3.2 Asymmetric shifts in market participants’ welfare 
The introduction of penalties does not have the same effect on all market participants. This can 
be seen by examining how their expected utilities change with the introduction of penalties. 
Figures 9 and 10 represent changes affecting the benchmark (our benchmark being the reference 
case with no penalty). 
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Figure 9 : Influence of penalty on welfare changes (with only flexible generators and near real-time gate 
closure). 
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Figure 10 : Influence of penalty on welfare changes (with only flexible generators and far real-time gate 
closure) 
 
Two primary consequences are observed.  
The first is a redistribution of welfare between retailers and generators. Net purchasers on the 
forward market are retailers, and their welfare diminishes. Generators are net sellers, and their 
welfare increases. It may be tempting to consider this transfer of welfare to correspond to a 
service rendered by flexible generators in real time. However, in our extended model (both 
flexible and inflexible technologies) we observe that inflexible generators also benefit from this 
transfer. This shines the spotlight on the nature of the redistribution between buyers and sellers 
on the forward market. 
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The second consequence is that penalties have a greater impact on small, vertically 
disintegrated agents (Type B retailers) than on those that are large or integrated. Type B retailers 
(which are both small and disintegrated) see their welfare fall twice as much, proportionally, as 
type A retailers (which are large or vertically integrated in generation). 
Therefore the use of penalties creates a barrier to entry to agents that are small or not vertically 
integrated in generation. The balancing mechanism harms all agents who need to contend with 
greater uncertainty (retailers or aggregators with small client bases, small generators, wind 
generators, etc.). This barrier may deter some agents from entry, and thus undermine the 
dynamics of competition. 
 
3.2.3.3 Increased revenues for the TSO 
Introduction of a penalty diverts revenues to the TSO (cf. Figures 11 and 12).  
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Figure 11 : Influence of penalty on TSO Revenue (only flexible generators) 
 
The TSO’s revenues (flippantly referred to as the “beer fund”) increase with the level of the 
penalties and the temporal distance of the gate closure. This revenue mechanism does not 
provide the TSO with the right incentives to create the best design for the balancing arrangement, 
for which the grid has a real need in real time. The fact that the TSO’s revenues automatically 
increase when the level of the penalty rises and the gate closure moves ahead in time does not 
provide any useful evidence regarding the exact improvement in the security. 
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TSO's expected revenue
Extended Model (flexible & inflexible generators)
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Figure 12 : Influence of penalty on TSO Revenue (flexible and inflexible generators) 
 
It is important to observe that the welfare of large generators also increases with the level of 
the penalties. Since, in some countries, TSOs, large generators, and vertically integrated 
generators may all be quite closely knit, and all have a great deal of say in choosing the market 
design rules, we may fear that a poor initial choice of balancing arrangements may be followed 
by a lengthy period in which these faulty bases are entrenched. This will make it very difficult to 
improve this setup after the fact. 
 
3.2.3.4 Inefficiencies 
In our baseline model, in which all producers are flexible, efficiency in generation is not 
undermined by the introduction of penalties. Inefficiencies that crop up are attributable to the 
fact that penalties increase the volatility of profits and that, since market participants are risk 
averse, their expected utility decreases (Figure 13).  
Figure 14 reveals the impact of penalties in the model with two generation technologies 
(flexible and inflexible). Here, inefficiencies in generation arise as inflexible producers make 
poor output choices because of price distortions on the forward market. It is important to notice 
that inflexible generators primarily take their cue from forward prices in deciding on output 
levels. Another important consequence of introducing penalties into the dual technology model is 
that real-time prices and imbalance prices are affected by excess generation from the inflexible. 
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Figure 13 : Penalty decreasing efficiency in the baseline model (all generators being flexible) 
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Figure 14 : Penalty decreasing efficiency in the extended model (generators being flexible or inflexible) 
 
4 Conclusion 
We have examined the economic consequences of using penalties in balancing arrangements. 
Running a few numerical simulations on the basis of a two-period equilibrium model, we have 
found four principal economic consequences: (1°) a distortion of the forward price; (2°) an 
asymmetric shift in the welfare of market participants that primarily impacts on small and 
disintegrated agents; (3°) an increase in the TSO's revenues; and (4°) inefficiencies. The 
magnitude of these consequences increases as the temporal position of the gate closure moves 
away from real time. 
Of course, the models we use are subject to several limitations, especially since they are based 
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on strong assumptions (perfect competition, no constraints on generation capacity, no constraints 
on grid capacity, no reserves market, etc.). Therefore, we must seek to eliminate some of these 
assumptions in future work. We shall also conduct a sensitivity analysis to see how the results 
react to changes to the parameters. 
Nonetheless, in light of these preliminary results, and given the current situation in which 
countries in the western European Union continue to seek to improve and harmonise their market 
designs, we wish to underline that economic consequences of this type cannot continue to be 
ignored by decision makers…whether TSOs or regulators.  
We do not deny that balancing provisions are extremely important for the security of the grid 
and the good functioning of the electricity reforms. However, it is clear now that these balancing 
arrangements are not technical security mechanisms. Rather, they are institutional arrangements 
in which the TSO sets the rules of the game for other agents, with implications not only in real 
time, but also on forward markets (day ahead and intraday).  
In their choice of the temporal position of gate closure, TSOs define the structure of 
information available to agents making decisions on forward markets, and by extension the level 
of uncertainty entering into their decisions. With the combination of gate closure positions and 
penalty levels, TSOs define the incentive system that applies to decisions made under uncertainty 
by other agents who are risk averse. Moreover, these rules of the game have asymmetric impacts 
on retailers and generators, on small, vertically disintegrated and large, vertically integrated 
generators, and on flexible and inflexible generators. These rules may also function as barriers to 
entry for small, disintegrated actors.  
In conclusion, the security mechanisms that are TSO’s balancing arrangements are not neutral 
in terms of their impacts on wholesale markets or the competitive dynamics on these markets. 
Since there exist several alternative designs for balancing arrangements, it is not unreasonable to 
expect TSOs and regulators to account for the economic consequences of the various models 
when they establish the architecture of the wholesale market: either during the initial market 
design, or during a later review in light of the experience accumulated in other countries.  
Even though there currently exists a strong preference in Europe for conserving “balancing 
mechanisms” and for delaying the implementation of “balancing markets,” it remains that the 
time is right to conduct a comparative study of the existing balancing arrangements, since several 
bordering countries are seeking to create closer links between their PXs and their provisions for 
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allocating interconnections in order to lay the foundation for a new regional market. 
 
5 Appendices 
Extended model with two generation technologies (flexible and inflexible) 
In this extension, we introduce a new generation technology, which is inflexible, alongside the 
flexible technology of our baseline model. Inflexible generators must determine their level of 
output within the uncertain framework of the forward market, since their output cannot be 
adjusted beyond gate closure. They make decisions by observing the forward market. 
To simplify, we assume that inflexible generators do not voluntarily take positions of 
imbalance in real time. Consequently, they generate exactly the quantity that they sold on the 
forward market (
lIG
X = FIGlX ). The goal of the inflexible generator l is thus to select 
F
IGl
X   (or 
lIG
X  ) 
so as to maximise profit. This profit function is given by:   
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The first-order necessary condition is: 
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The conditions for equilibrium on the forward market (5) become: 
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From equations (1), (2), (4), and (11), we find that: 
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jDD ωω ,  is global demand for the state of the world ω . 
 
Thus, equation (7) becomes: 
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where ωρ ,iFG′   is the unhedged profit of flexible generators (i.e. with 0=FFGiX  ), whence: 
2
,, )(2
1)0( ∑−===′
l
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FGFGFG liii
XDX ωωω σπρ . 
We can now use equations (3), (11) and (12), along with the optimal positions on the forward 
markets (equations (8), (10) and (13)), to find the market equilibria. ( FP , RTPω ).   
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